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APPLICABLE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5.
Disposition of property-Maintenance and health care of parties and
children—Division of debts-Court to have continuing jurisdiction—Custody and
parent-time—Determination of alimony-Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining
alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring
support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by
the payor spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing
at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection
(7)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles
and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the
time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have been conceived

iii

or bora during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that
existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both,
that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining
the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced
through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the
marriage.
(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and
new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to
address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered,
unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the
payor may not be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (7).
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share
living expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court
finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of
iv

years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony,
the court finds extenuating circumstaaces that justify the payment of alimony for a
longer period of time.

v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-28-3(2)(h) (1999).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES;
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that the long
duration of the parties' solemnized and unsolemnized marriages was one factor to
consider in awarding the Petitioner alimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
for a period of time greater than the five-year period of the parties' unsolemnized
marriage.
Standard of Review:

The District Court's application of a statute to its

findings of fact is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538
(Utah 2001).
II.
Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that
extenuating circumstances existed which justified an award of damages for a
period of time greater than the five-year period of the parties' unsolemnized
marriage.
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Standard of Review:

The District Court's application of a statute to its

findings of fact is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538
(Utah 2001).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from the District Court's

findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment on remand from the Court of
Appeals in the case of Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171 (Utah Ct. App. 2000).
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. The

Petitioner, following a fourteen-year marriage to the Respondent, was originally
divorced from him pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce entered on July 18,
1994. Following the divorce, however, the relationship between the parties
remained unchanged and the District Court below determined, inter alia, (1) that
the parties entered into a common law marriage commencing immediately
following the entry of the original decree of divorce; (2) that the Petitioner was
entitled to a Decree of Divorce effective as of July, 1999,fromthe common law
marriage; and that the Petitioner was entitled to the payment of alimony for a
period of 16 years, based upon the duration of parties' marriages. The Respondent
appealed, and this Court affirmed on the common law marriage issue but reversed
and remanded in part, determining that, in the absence of extenuating
2

circumstances, alimony could not be awarded for a period greater than the five year
term of the unsolemnized common law marriage. Kelley v. Kelley, 3 P.3d 171, 180
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). On remand, the District Court made additional findings of
fact and conclusions of law, determined that there were such extenuating
circumstances, and awarded alimony for a period often years commencing
December, 1998. This appeal followed.
C. Statement of Facts.
1.

The parties were initially married on May 24,1980, and were

divorced for the first time pursuant to a stipulated decree of divorce entered on July
18, 1994. (Finding of Fact No. 1, R. at 1834.)
2.

The original decree awarded the petitioner $ 1,000.00 per month child

support, and $1,000.00 per month alimony. The alimony was to be terminated in
three years, upon remarriage of the petitioner, or by operation of law, whichever
occurred first. (Finding of Fact No. 3, R. at 1835.)
3.

Following the original decree of divorce, the parties immediately

entered into a common law marital relationship. The respondent continued to
provide the petitioner with approximately $7,500.00 per month to meet family
expenses, just as he had done prior to the decree being entered. None of the titles
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to the property awarded in the decree were ever changed until the parties began
having difficulty in 1996. (Finding of Fact No. 4, R. at 1835.)
4.

The parties herein had been married for a total of fourteen years when

the original decree of divorce was entered in July, 1994. As part of the original
decree, the parties stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000.00 per
month, and alimony of $1,000.00 per month. The alimony was to terminate in
three years, upon the petitioners' death or remarriage, or by operation of law,
whichever first occurred. At the time of the original decree, the petitioner had not
worked outside the home since the time of her marriage in 1980. She had no
income. Her expenses during the course of the common law marriage far exceeded
the $2,000.00 per month provided in the decree. Her house payment alone,
without considering any other expenses, was $2,400.00 per month. The respondent
had been providing her approximately $7,500.00 per month to meet family
expenses. (Finding of Fact No. 24; R. at 1841.)
5.

The provisions of the 1994 decree were clearly inadequate as

evidenced by the parties' continued actions. They continued to reside together in a
common law relationship just as though no decree had ever been entered. The
respondent continued to provide support to petitioner and the children in the
amount in excess of $7,000.00 per month, just as he had before. The petitioner and
4

the children continued in the lifestyle to which they had become accustomed. It
was not until after the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things changed.
(Finding of Fact No. 25; R. at 1842.)
6.

Subsequently, the Commissioner established temporary support and

alimony of $6,000.00 per month. At trial, based upon the petitioner's gross income
of $1,486.00 per month, and respondent's historical income of $10,000.00 per
month, and in light of the expenses of the parties, the Court set child support at
$2,000.00 per month and alimony at $3,000.00 per month. (Finding of Fact No.
26; R. at 1842.)
7.

The parties have been married continually, in either a solemnized

marriage or a common law marriage, from 1980 through July of 1999, more than
eighteen years. (Finding of Fact No. 27; R. at 1842.)
8.

On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court determined

that the following facts were extenuating circumstances which justified an award
of alimony for a period longer than the term of the parties' common law marriage:
(1) the long duration of the parties' marriage; (2) the standard of living to which
the petitioner and the parties children had become accustomed (which was
encouraged by the Respondent); (3) the needs of the Petitioner and her inability to
make more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4) the respondent's ability to make
5

substantially more than the petitioner. (Conclusions of Law No. 13; R. at 1845.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE RESPONDENT IDENTIFIES THE WRONG
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL. THE
APPLICATION OF A STATUTE BY THE DISTRICT
COURT TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS IS
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
NOT FOR "CORRECTNESS."

The District Court's determination on remand in this case involves an
application of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1999) to the Court's factual findings, and
any such application is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, not for correctness.
See, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 27 P.3d 538 (Utah 2001). Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306
(Utah Ct. App. 1999), and Endody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 306 (Utah Ct. App. 1999),
are distinguishable.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE TOTAL
LENGTH OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGES AS ONE
FACTOR IN AWARDING ALIMONY FOR AN
EXTENDED PERIOD.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) contains no limitations concerning what
factors the District Court may consider as extenuating circumstances justifying an
award of alimony for a period of time longer than the parties' marriage. Nor is
there any Utah case law establishing any such limitations. The District Court
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properly considered a number of factors, in addition to the length of the parties'
marriage, in finding the existence of such extenuating circumstances.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE
OF EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS
CASE.

The Respondent's argument is based solely upon his view of the evidence
presented to the Court after the remand of this case to the District Court following
the Respondent's first appeal in this case. It fails to take into account the totality of
evidence offered by the parties in this protracted litigation, and amounts to an
argument that the Court's factualfindingsare clearly erroneous. Because the
Respondent has failed to marshal the evidence in favor of the Court's findings,
however, the Respondent cannot prevail on this issue.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE RESPONDENT IDENTIFIES THE WRONG
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL. THE
APPLICATION OF A STATUTE BY THE DISTRICT
COURT TO ITS FACTUAL FINDINGS IS
REVIEWED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, NOT
FOR "CORRECTNESS."

In Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171,179 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (hereinafter
"Kelley 7") this Court reversed the District Court's determination awarding the
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Petitioner Sonia Kelly alimony for a period of sixteen years and "remand[ed] for
the entry of further findings addressing whether extenuating circumstances exist as
to satisfy section 30-3-5(7)(h)," quoting Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999). The Respondent now challenges the District Court's application of
the cited statute to its additional factual findings and the determination, based upon
extenuating circumstances, that alimony would be awarded for a period in excess
of thefiveyear duration of the parties' common law marriage (the District Court
ordered that alimony be paid for a period of ten years). The Respondent, citing
Rehn, supra, and Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996),
asserts that the adequacy of the District Court's finding of extenuating
circumstances presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness.
Rehn and Endrody are both distinguishable. In Rehn, the Court held only
that "[wjhether a trial court'sfindingsof fact in awarding attorney fees are
sufficient is a question of law which we review for correctness." Rehn, 91A P.2d at
313. See also Endrody, supra, 91A P.2d at 1169. No award of attorney fees is at
issue in the present appeal. In Endrody, the Court also held that "whether a trial
court's equitable powers over divorce proceedings allow it to invade a valid, intervivos trust, is [a question] of law reviewed for correctness." Endrody, 914 P.2d at
1168. Again, no such issue is present in this appeal.
8

In Clark v. Clark, 27 P.2d 538 (Utah 2001), the Utah Supreme Court noted
that an appeal
involving] a review of the trial court's application of statutory
requirements to factual findings . . . is a mixed question of law and
fact. See Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah
1997). We apply the same standard used by the court of appeals: a
trail court's findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are
clearly erroneous, and the trial court's application of the statute to
those findings will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
Id. See also Searle v. Searle, 38 P.3d 307, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 2001); Thomas v.
Thomas, 987 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Consequently, the Respondent has identified the wrong standard of review in
this case, and only by meeting the higher abuse of discretion standard may the
Respondent prevail on this appeal. Moreover, even if a correction of error standard
is applicable, which it is not, the District Court correctly applied Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-5 and its rulings on remand should not be disturbed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING THE TOTAL
LENGTH OF THE PARTIES' MARRIAGES AS ONE
FACTOR IN AWARDING ALIMONY FOR AN
EXTENDED PERIOD.

The Respondent takes the position that the District Court was prohibited as a
matter of law from considering the total length of time the parties were married in
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considering the duration of the alimony award. As noted by this Court in Kelly I,
however,
In Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994), the Supreme Court held
that when a non-solemnized marriage is established under section 301-4.5, the actual duration of the relationship, predating such
establishment, is recognized.
Kelley I at 180. Nothing in Kelley I suggests that the total duration of the parties'
married relationship cannot be considered as one factor in the determination of the
extenuating circumstances justifying extended alimony. Rather, the Court in
Kelley /held only that alimony attributable to the marriage at issue in that case —
the unsolemnized or "common law" marriage — could not be awarded for a longer
period of time than that marriage in the absence of extenuating circumstances.
Clearly, one such justification for extended alimony has to do with the duration of
the total relationship. Therefore, once a common law marriage has been
established, it is relevant to consider other periods during which the parties were
married as one factor to consider in deciding the duration of alimony to be
awarded. Indeed, the statutory framework for alimony awards in Utah compels
this result. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7) provides that the Court shall, "in
determining alimony," consider "the length of the marriage." Clearly, an unusual
and extenuating circumstance in this case is the fact that, while the parties

10

technically obtained a divorce on July 18, 1994 (Finding of Fact No. 1, R. at 1834).
their relationship thereafter did not change in any fashion whatsoever (Finding of
Fact No. 4, R. at 1835). See also Findings of Fact Nos. 10,1 ll, 2 17,3 18,4 and 20,5
u

The Court finds that the agreement between the parties to divorce was an
agreement for a non-traditional divorce which created a legal fiction only, designed
to protect the residence of the parties from the threat of creditors."
2

"Both of the parties attended a parenting class and the Court accepts the
testimony of Dr. Marty Hood and finds it is credible that during the intermission
halfway through the parenting class, Respondent approached her and told her that
the divorce the parties were going through was only a business thing and that the
children would never know there was even going to be a divorce and that there was
no real need for them to continue to attend the class on how to deal with the
children in a divorce situation. He further told her that there was not going to be a
separation. The result of respondent's statements was that Ms. Hood signed a
Certificate of Completion allowing the parties to leave before the class was
completed."
3

"Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, there was no
change in the relationship of the parties and in their living arrangements. The
parties continued to live the same as they had prior to the divorce. Titles to marital
residence was not transferred until after this action was filed. The title to the
Kodiak property was never transferred. The parties continued to maintain a joint
checking account. The parties filed a joint 1994 income tax return, reflecting that
they were husband and wife as of the end of 1994. The parties continued to
cohabit with sexual relations. The children, who at that time were nine and three
and one-half years of age, were never told about any changes to their parents'
relationship."
4

"The parties continued to socialize together; they attended a Christmas
party together in December 1994, each held the other out as a married couple. No
one in the community was told of the divorce."
5

"In May, 1995, respondent sent petitioner an anniversary card in which he
indicated he loved her and a wish for another 15 years."
11

related to the second Decree of Divorce (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, R. at 1659 — 1664; Appellee's appendix.) During the period of the
common law marriage, and despite the provisions of the first divorce decree, the
Respondent provided support to Petitioner and the children in the amount of
$7,000.00 per month, just has he had done before the original Decree of Divorce
(Finding of Fact No. 25; R. at 1842) and despite the terms of the original decree
pursuant to which he was in fact obligated to pay much less. The complete
continuity of the parties' relationship in all respects during the term of the common
law marriage justified the Court in treating the long duration of the relationship as
one factor to consider in ordering alimony for an extended period.
There is virtually no case law in Utah addressing the issue of what does or
does not constitute an "extenuating circumstance" for purposes of awarding
extended alimony pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h). The determination
whether such circumstances exist must be decided by the trial judge on a case by
case basis. Here, the unique facts — involving a continuous married relationship
for a period of at least 18 years in either a solemnized or unsolemnized marriage —
justify the District Court's determination to consider that long relationship as one
extenuating circumstance in the decision to award extended alimony

12

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF
EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE.

The Respondent challenges the District Court's finding of extenuating
circumstances in this case upon the ground that "the trial court's findings do not
support its legal conclusion of extenuating circumstances, they only support its
legal conclusion of the underlying award of alimony." (Brief of the Appellant, p.
9.) The Respondent's argument ignores the District Court's actual findings in
favor of extenuating circumstances, where the Court focused on four extenuating
circumstances in awarding extended alimony: "(1) the long duration of the parties'
marriage; (2) the standard of living to which the petitioner and the parties children
had become accustomed (which was encouraged by the Respondent); (3) the needs
of the Petitioner and her inability to make more than $1,486.00 per month; and (4)
the respondent's ability to make substantially more than the petitioner."
(Conclusions of Law No. 13; R. at 1845.) The Respondent erroneously suggests
that the Court was limited to whatever new testimony and other evidence it
received after remand to address the issue of extenuating circumstances. (Brief of
the Appellant, p. 10) This argument is startling; nothing in Kelley I required the
Court to take any additional testimony or evidence in the case. Rather, in
determining the existence of extenuating circumstances, the Court of Appeals
13

clearly left the District Court free to consider the entire record in the case, and not
merely the additional evidence offered by the parties at the invitation of the Court.
Thus, the District Court was free to rely upon, among other things, its prior
findings of fact in determining the existence of "extenuating circumstances." In
Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306, 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1999), the Court of Appeals
reversed an award of extended alimony because the District Court "failed to
explicitly use the term 'extenuating circumstances' in its findings." Here, the
District Court did identify the precise reasons it relied upon in determining that
extenuating circumstances justified an award of extended alimony. Indeed, in its
Memorandum Decision setting forth its findings of extenuating circumstances, the
Court notes as follows:
The Court next turns to the question of whether there are
extenuating circumstances which would justify the Court in awarding
alimony to the petitioner for a period longer than the five year length
of the common law marriage. In that regard, the Court finds that these
parties had been married a total of fourteen years when the Decree of
Divorce was entered in July, 1994. As part of that Decree, the parties
stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000 per month, and
alimony of $ 1,000 per month. The alimony was to terminate in three
years, upon petitioner's remarriage, or by operation of law, whichever
occurred first. At the time of the Decree, petitioner had not worked
out of the home since their marriage in 1980. She had no income.
Her expenses far exceeded the two thousand per month provided in
the Decree. Her house payment alone, without considering any other
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expenses, was $2,400.00 per month. The respondent had been
providing her approximately $7,500 per month to meet family
expenses.
The provisions of the 1994 Decree were clearly inadequate as
evidenced by the parties' continued actions. They continued to reside
together in a common law relationship just as though no Decree had
ever been entered. Respondent continued to porvide support to
petitioner and the children in the amount in excess of $7,000 per
month, just as he had before. The petitioner and the children
continued in the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed. It was
not until after the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things
changed.
(Memorandum Decision, R. at 1617 — 1618, Appellee's Appendix.) Essentially,
the Respondent asserts that all of these findings are without support in the record
because there is allegedly no support for them in the record of the proceedings
following the remand of the case. In making this argument, the Respondent
ignores virtually all of the other evidence in the voluminous trial record to argue, in
effect, that the additional findings of fact entered by the Court are clearly
erroneous. To prevail on any such argument, it is incumbent upon the Respondent
to marshal the evidence supporting the findings he challenges. Kelley I, 9 P.3d
171, 178 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). The Respondent has not undertaken this burden,
and thus he is unable to show that the Court's findings are clearly erroneous.
Further, "to determine if the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence
and thus clearly erroneous, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the
15

findings." Kelly I at 178. Viewing the findings of the trial court in this fashion, it
is apparent that the Court's reliance on four separate extenuating circumstances to
award extended alimony in this case was entirely proper.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court
addressing the existence of extenuating circumstances in this case should be
affirmed.
DATED this ' ^ ^ day of June, 2003.

Iiomas N. Thompson
Attorney for Appellee

s

James C. Haskins ^
Attorney for Appellee

/
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DART ADAMSON DONOVAN & HANSON
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MARK A. LARSEN (3727)
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW
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Telephone: (801) 364-6500
Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
—000OOO000—

SONIA KELLEY,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
WAYN" KELLEY,

:

Respondent.

Civil No. 944700827DA
Judge Rodney S. Page

—000OOO000—

The above-entitled consolidated matters came on regularly for trial on the 3rd and
4th days of December, 1998, petitioner appearing in person and by her attorneys, B. L. Dart
and Mark A. Larsen, respondent appearing in person and by his attorney, Ellen Maycock
and the Court having heard testimony from witnesses and having received various
documentary evidence and the matter having been argued and submitted and the Court
being fully advised, hereby makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Court finds that the parties were married to each other on the 24th day

of May 1980, in Ft. Worth, Texas.
2.

During this marriage the parties had two children born as issue of this

marriage, to wit: Christopher W. Kelley, currently 14 years of age, born February 5, 1985
and Erin Renee Kelley, currently eight years of age, born September 9, 1990.
3.

Over the course of the marriage respondent worked primarily in construction.

He founded and was the owner of Altex Construction in Alaska involved in work on the
DEW line and other government contracts.
4.

In 1990 DSI was created. Respondent owns 55% of DSI's stock. DSI was

involved in the construction of government facilities and modification of government
facilities to insulate those facilities from terrorism. This work was worldwide.
5.

During the marriage between the parties respondent's work was such that it

required him to be away from home for extended periods which included on occasion
renting apartments in which to stay. This occurred on one occasion in Colorado and on
one occasion in Texas. Because of the nature of his work, he was home intermittently,
was gone for long periods of time on a regular basis and was very seldom at home on a
long-term, continuous basis.
6. •

In 1993 and 1994 DSI became involved with the Mathews Companies,

corporations which were in difficulty at that time. DSI sought to take over Mathews to
shore it up so that Mathews would be able to perform under various contracts on which DSI
2

had contingent liability and also to improve DSI's financial situation. These were the facts
as of Spring of 1994.
7.

The parties were not unfamiliar with the vicissitudes of the construction

business. They experienced a bankruptcy while they were in Texas. They had given a
deed in lieu of foreclosure on the residence in which they had lived in the State of
Washington.
8.

The transactions between DSI and Mathews Companies required that

respondent individually indemnify Mathews Companies by signing bonds for Mathews
Companies' performance which would expose his assets to considerable risk.
9.

In discussions between the parties, respondent told petitioner about this

problem and the need to preserve and protect the family home. He proposed that the
parties should enter into a divorce so that the home could be placed in petitioner's name
to protect it from potential of creditors because of the concerns he had related to the
DSI/Mathews Companies transaction. He represented to the petitioner that the parties
were not going to be separated and that nothing would change from how they had lived
before.
10.

During the spring and summer of 1994, the parties agreed to and did enter

into a divorce action, resulting in a divorce being entered on the 18th day of July, 1994, in
the District Court of Davis County, Civil No. 944700827DA. The Court finds that the
agreement between the parties to divorce was an agreement for a non-traditional divorce
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which created a legal fiction only, designed to protect the residence of the parties from the
threat of creditors.
11.

In connection with the divorce action petitioner contacted an attorney.

Respondent waived his rights. Both of the parties attended a parenting class and the Court
accepts the testimony of Dr. Marty Hood and finds it is credible that during the intermission
halfway through the parenting class, respondent approached her and told her that the
divorce the parties were going through was only a business thing and that the children
would never know there was even going to be a divorce and that there was no real need
for them to continue to attend the class on how to deal with the children in a divorce
situation. He further told her that there was not going to be a separation. The result of
respondent's statements was that Ms. Hood signed a Certificate of Completion allowing
the parties to leave before the class was completed.
12.

Under the Decree of Divorce petitioner was awarded the custody of the minor

children of the parties subject to respondent's rights of visitation. The petitioner was
awarded the house and furnishings. Respondent was awarded his stock in DSI and the
parties' investment in property in Kodiak, Alaska. It was further provided that respondent
would be responsible for the payment of all debts up to June 1994.
13.

Respondent was to pay child support of $1,000 a month for the two minor

children of the parties and alimony of $1,000 a month to the petitioner. He was further
ordered to maintain health insurance for the children and life insurance on himself for the
benefit of the children. The divorce was granted to the petitioner on her Complaint.
4

14.

At that time, the Court finds DSI was a viable, but closely held, corporation

which listed considerable assets, including the balance sheet of March 31, 1994,
introduced as Exhibit No. 3, reflecting a book value of $1,134,828.09. The Court further
finds, however, the value is found by a number of factors and book value is only one of
those factors.

Because DSI is a closely-held corporation, and its primary assets were

accounts receivable and similar assets, this brings into question its true value. There is no
question that the respondent's interest in DSI had some value and that respondent's
interest in the Kodiak property also had some value. The Kodiak property was generating
$10,000 per month in income and, at that time, it was expected to produce for a period into
the future.
15.

At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, the mortgage

payment on the home awarded to the petitioner was $2,400 a month, which was $400
more than the combined support and alimony award to the petitioner. This was at a time
when petitioner had not worked outside of the home for a considerable period of time and
was not employed earning any income, although she graduated from college.
16.

Prior to the divorce the standard of living of the parties was one in which

resoondent would give to petitioner $7,500 a month to pay bills. This arrangement had
existed for some substantial period of time. Also, at the time of the divorce respondent was
receiving a draw through his employment with DSI in the amount of $8,000 a month and
was further receiving a distribution on the Kodiak property of $10,000 a month, a combined
amount of $18,000 a month.
5
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Following the entry of the Decree of Divorce in July 1994, there was no

change in the relationship of the parties and in their living arrangements

The parties

continued to live the same as they had prior to the divorce Titles to marital residence was
not transferred until after this action was filed The title to the Kodialk property was never
transferred The parties continued to maintain a joint checking account The parties filed
a joint 1994 income tax return, reflecting that they were husband and wife as of the end of
1994 The parties continued to cohabit with sexual relations The children, who at that
time were nine and three and one-half years of age, were never told about any changes
in their parents' relationship
18

In July, 1994, the parties appeared at a counseling class and told the

counselor that this divorce was only for business purposes and that the children would
never know that the parties were divorced The parties continued to socialize together,
they attended a Christmas party together in December 1994, each held the other out as
a married couple No one in the community was told of the divorce at that time During
this time, respondent maintained an apartment in Texas
19

Respondent represented that he was concerned about his business dealings

and the possibility of telephone surveillance, telling the petitioner that he could not talk with
her on the phone
20

In May 1995, respondent sent petitioner an anniversary card in which he

indicated he loved her and a wish for another 15 years See Exhibit No 6
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21.

In the summer of 1995, as part of a family vacation, the parties traveled to

Mexico, , shared a room and had sexual relations.
22.

In October 1995, respondent faxed a letter to petitioner expressing his love

and looking forward to being with petitioner at Christmas so that things could again be the
way they had been. See Exhibit No. 8.
23.

In the fall of 1995, petitioner became suspicious that there was another

woman. Respondent told petitioner that his relationship with the other woman was only a
fling and that it was over. The parties' relationship was reestablished and everything
continued as it had in the past during their marriage, including their sexual relationship.
24.

During the entire period from the entry of the Decree of Divorce the financial

relationship remained the same and respondent provided petitioner with funds at the same
standard of living which had existed prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce.
25.

In the spring of 1996, petitioner found out that respondent's relationship with

the other woman had not terminated. In May 1996, there was an altercation which was
primarily precipitated by a visitation dispute, resulting in the police being called and the
filing of criminal charges against respondent. Following this altercation, respondent cut
petitioner off from funds as they had previously been provided. Because of this action,
petitioner sought legal counsel and subsequently filed actions including a Petition to Modify
and pleadings setting forth theories of a common law marriage and fraud.
26.

"* ^e Court finds that there was no fraud or misrepresentation in connection

with the divor ^ in 1994. Petitioner was college educated, and the Court finds that her
7

claimed reliance on the representations of respondent was not justifiable

Given the

circumstances at that time, however, neither party expected the property aspects of the
divorce to be valid nor implemented
27

The Court finds that as of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 18,

1994, petitioner knew that they would have to remarry As of that day, the parties were
unmarried

They continued their marital relationship, they continued to cohabit, they

continued to treat each other as married they had joint checking accounts, and respondent
maintained all of his personal property at the marital residence

The parties filed joint

income tax returns for the 1994 year Respondent sent petitioner money from which she
serviced joint debts

The parties maintained joint credit cards

The parties held

themselves out as married in the area of their domicile in Davis County, and in that area
of the domicile had the reputation of being married They held themselves out to their
children as married The parties continued to cohabit and hold each other out as spouse
through April of 1996 The parties had a reputation in the community for being married and
all of these actions arise out of a contract between two consenting parties
28

The Court has heard much testimony regarding DSI's value It is difficult to

set the value of DSI The Court finds that the critical day of valuation is the day of the
Court's ruling As of this time DSI is bereft of value except for receivables and a lien on
the Bear Hollow house, which are of questionable value

In 1997 DSI did receive a

substantial settlement in litigation in which it was involved in the amount of $1,900,000,
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relief of debt and an agreement to hold DSI harmless. The net payment to DSI was
$1,300,000 after the deduction^ attorneys' fees and costs.
29.

The money from DSI's net settlement was used primarily for the purchase of

a Mercedes 600SL and the construction of a large residence in Summit County, known as
the Bear Hollow property. These expenditures were primarily for the benefit of respondent.
The settlement funds were not used to retire DSI's substantial outstanding debt.
30.

With regard to the Kodiak property, its value is now negative, and the Court

is unaware of its value, if any, now.
31.

Respondent has an interest in Omega Oil. From the testimony it is not clear

whether this interest is a 10% interest in stock or an option to acquire 10% of the stock .
Respondent is the president of Omega Oil and from Omega Oil receives a monthly income
of $6,000 since June of 1996. Based upon the evidence before the Court, the Court is
unable to set a value on respondent's interest in Omega Oil.
32.

Respondent is the title owner of property in Summit County known as the

Bear Hollow property located at 2525 Bear Hollow Drive, Park City, Utah, which is more
particularly described as:
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of
the Summit County Recorder.
The value of this property is in question. There has been testimony of from $2,000,000 to
$1,500,000. Against this property there is a primary trust deed obligation of $500,000 and
a second trust deed obligation of $250,000. In addition, there is a $958,000 mechanic's
9

lien which has been filed by DSI and which currently is in litigation. The parties' equity
interest in the Bear Hollow house, therefore, currently is in litigation in Summit County,
Utah.
33.

The Court finds the home at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah,

has a value of $345,000, subject to a first mortgage obligation of $236,000 and an
attorney's lien from Louise Knauer, petitioner's prior attorney, of $10,000, resulting in a
remaining equity of $109,000.
34.

The Court finds that respondent has manipulated his corporations by taking

funds through loans and not as income with these withdrawals as he sees fit. This is not
a traditional method of compensation, and respondent has manipulated his income as he
has seen fit.
35.

The Court finds that respondent has used the assets of these businesses to

meet his own living expenses and to purchase property for his own interest. The Mercedes
600SL is an example.
36.

The Court finds that historically respondent has had an income in excess of

$10,000 a month with funds received from the Kodiak property and a salary of $8,000 from
DSI. Currently respondent receives a salary of $6,000 a month from Omega Oil. In
addition, respondent has received funds through loans not reflected as income from his
various businesses. Consistent with his past manipulations, respondent currently has
manipulated his income to limit his income presented in this proceeding.
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37.

The Court finds that the income amounts reflected above coincide with the

amount of funds utilized by the parties to meet ongoing family expenses, both prior to the
entry of the Decree of Divorce in July, 1994, and since that time.
38.

The Court finds that respondent currently has the ability to produce income

at the amount of $10,000 a month and finds that his income is in this amount.
39.

Petitioner has sought and obtained employment and currently has the ability

to earn an income on an hourly rate of $8.71 per hour in the gross amount of $1,498 a
month on a full-time basis. This amount would be subject to taxes. She is capable of
working full time, but is working on a part-time basis by choice.
40.

The gross income of the parties exceeds the child support guideline.

41.

The Court finds that each of the parties have incurred attorneys' fees in this

action. The Court further finds that there has been certain obstreperous conduct on the
part of respondent with respect to discovery, making it difficult to process and prosecute
this action. The Court further finds that respondent has a substantial ability to earn an
income.
42.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the

Court heard testimony from Louise Knauer and finds that those fees were necessarily
incurred. The work performed was reasonable and necessary for the prosecution of this
action. The Court further finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees.
The attorney's fees petitioner incurred for the services of Louise Knauer in the amount of
$10,951 were reasonably and necessarily incurred.
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43.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B L. Dart and Mark

A. Larsen, the Court finds that substantial work was performed, that a large amount of this
work was necessary to prosecute this case to a conclusion through trial. The Court further
finds that petitioner has no funds with which to pay these fees. The request for attorney's
fees of Dart and Larsen is the amount of $46,574.95, as reflected in Exhibit Nos. 15 & 16.
The Court finds that this is excessive, that these are two well-qualified lawyers, either of
whom could have individually tried the case without the need of the other. Under all the
facts and circumstances of this case the Court finds that the reasonable amount for the
attorneys' fees incurred by these attorneys for their reasonable and necessary services is
the sum of $25,000 forwhich respondent should be responsible to petitioner.
Based upon the preceding findings of fact, the Court enters the following
conclusions of law:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Petitioner has failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

2.

There was a common law marriage entered into by the parties by reason of

their ongoing relationship. This common law marriage commenced immediately following
the entry of the Decree of Divorce on the 18th day of July, 1994, and will terminate at §uch
time as the Decree of Divorce enters in this case.
3.

The parties have now been separated since June 1996, the differences

between them are irreconcilable and petitioner is entitled to a divorce from respondent on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
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4.

In June of 1996,

respondent elected to terminate the parties ongoing

relationship and his financial support of petitioner. These actions constituted a substantial
change of circumstances.
5.

Based upon the change of circumstances which the Court has found and,

further, based upon the common law marriage of the parties, the Court hereby modifies the
terms of the former settlement to provide for the following award:
a.

Petitioner is awarded the equity of the parties in the home and real property
at 1995 South Maple Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah, subject to petitioner
assuming its outstanding indebtedness.

b.

Petitioner is awarded all furniture and fixtures located therein.

c.

Petitioner is awarded one-third of respondent's equity in the Bear Hollow
property, and respondent is awarded two-thirds of his equity in the Bear
Hollow property, subject to outstanding liens against it. The property is more
particularly described as:
Lot 27, Block 5, Cedar Draw Estates, according to the
official plat thereof, recorded in the official records of
the Summit County Recorder.
Respondent is ordered to pay all taxes, utilities, debt and Trust Deed Notes
on the Bear Hollow house. The parties at their mutual expense are to retain
an independent appraiser to establish an appraisal value for the Bear Hollow
property. The property is currently listed for sale and should continue to be
listed for sale over a multiple board listing under terms that the property is to
13

be sold for any cash offer for 90% or more of the appraised value. Each
party shall be apprised of any offers and have the right of open
communication with the listing realtor. If any other offers are received which
one party desires to accept and the other party does not desire to accept,
then the party desiring to accept the offer shall have the right to come before
the Court to request that the property be sold for this offer and the Court will
then make a determination of whether this sale is to occur on these terms.
d.

Respondent is awarded his interest in the property in Kodiak, Alaska, subject

to any outstanding obligations owing thereon. This property is more particularly described
as follows:
That portion of Lot two (2), Block ten (10), New Kodiak
Subdivision, according to Plat 72-2, located in this
Kodiak Recording District, Third Judicial District, State
of Alaska, which lies within the following described
property:
That portion of United States Survey Number 559,
located in the Kodiak Recording District, Third
Juaicial District, State of Alaska, more particularly
described as follows:
Beginning at Corner No. 1 of United States Survey
Number 1797, as shown on the Plat of Kodiak
Townsite, United States Survey Number 2537B, as
accepted by the Commissioner of the General Land
Office, September 11, 1941, said point being an
unnumbered corner of United States Survey Number
559, the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING of this
description;
Thence N 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 56.58 feet;
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Thence N 45 degrees 50' E, a distance of 138.09 feet;
Thence S 44 degrees 10' E, a distance of 131.38 feet;
Thence S 45 degrees 50" W, a distance of 138.00 feet,
more or less, to a point of intersection with a line drawn
S 44 degrees 22' W, a distance of 78.06 feet, more or
less, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
e.

Respondent is awarded his stock or option interests in Omega Oil.

f.

Respondent is awarded any property currently in his possession, including

furniture and furnishings and any interest, if any, in the Mercedes 600SL.
g.

Respondent is awarded certain personal property and to the extent it is in the
possession of petitioner and with reference to Exhibit P34, these items are
as follows:
(1) The floor standing globe.
(2) The Baldwin piano with delivery to occur after the last child
reaches majority or has moved from the home, whichever occurs first.
Petitioner shall have the responsibility of maintaining the piano and
having it tuned annually.
(3). One-half of the power and hand tools. The tools are to be divided
under an arrangement that petitioner is to make a List "A" and a List
"B", dividing the tools. Respondent will then have the choice of which
list of tools he desires and will be awarded those tools. Petitioner will
be awarded the rest.
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6.

With regard to the indebtedness of the parties, petitioner should assume and

pay the first mortgage obligation on the house and real property at 1995 South Maple
Ridge Drive, Bountiful, Utah. Respondent is ordered to assume and pay all other liabilities
and debt incurred during this marriage, including but not limited to any liabilities in
connection with DSI, the Bear Hollow property and Omega Oil.
7.

The Court finds that petitioner is entitled to be and is awarded the custody

of the minor children of the parties, subject to respondent's reasonable rights of visitation,
which right of visitation shall be, at a minimum, consistent with the schedule provided under
the Minimum Visitation Guidelines set forth in Title 30-3-35, Utah Code Annotated. The
respondent shall have the right to visit with the children irrespective of the payment of child
support. During visitation, there shall be no phone calls to the children unless there is an
emergency. Visitation should be specifically scheduled on a monthly basis one month in
advance and if respondent is scheduled to have the children for a visitation, he must give
the petitioner at least 24 hours' notice of his intent not to exercise the scheduled visitation.
Respondent should have such other extended visitation as agreeable
to the parties mutually.
8.

The Court finds that respondent's obligation to petitioner for child support,

taking into consideration the amount of alimony awarded, shall be the sum of $2,000 a
month and this award of child support shall commence with the month of December, 1998.
So long as respondent is current on his obligation for child support, he can claim one of the
children as a deduction for income tax purposes, which right to declare one of the children
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as a deduction for income tax purposes shall not arise until he has used his net loss carry
forward as reflected on his income tax returns.
9.

As a further obligation of child support, respondent shall pay health and

accident insurance for the benefit of the minor children and shall be responsible for twothirds of any uninsured medical, dental, orthodontia and counseling expenses for the minor
children of the parties.
10.

Based upon the financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds that

petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses, exclusive of liability for income taxes is the sum
of $5,000 a month. Respondent has detailed expenses of $10,500 a month, a substantial
portion of which relates to the Bear Hollow home, which is currently listed for sale and
which it is anticipated will be sold in the near future.
11.

Based upon the current financial circumstances of the parties the Court finds

that respondent shall pay to petitioner alimony in the sum of $3,000 a month and petitioner
is awarded alimony in this amount commencing with the month of December, 1998.
Petitioner's entitlement to alimony, based upon the marriage of the parties from 1980 to
1996, should be for the period of 16 years or until such time as petitioner remarries,
cohabits or the death of either party. Alimony under this judgment shoyld commence with
the month of December, 1998.
12.

The Court further finds that the alimony and child support in the combined

amount of $5,000

an amount which petitioner should receive from respondent retroactive

to the date of the first Order entered by Commissioner Dillon in this action. Respondent
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shall receive credit for any payments which he has made against this obligation, which
payments will be applied pro rata to child support and alimony with 2/5 to be applied to
child support and 3/5 to be applied to alimony. The Court finds that from the entry of the
Temporary Order through the month of February, 1999, based on this calculation and
reflecting credits for payments, there are arrearages which shall be reduced to judgment
in the amount of $93,586.00. These arrearages do not give credit to respondent for a
claimed payment on the first mortgage on petitioner's home in December, 1996, in the
amount of $6,902.25. If respondent can document this payment, then it would constitute
a reduction against the above balance.
The Court finds that the arrearages reflected above are for alimony
and child support with $37,434.40 as arrearages in child support and $56,151.60 as
arrearages in alimony.
13.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by Louise Knauer, the

Court awards attorneys' fees to petitioner in the form of a judgment for the services of
Louise Knauer in the amount of $10,951.
14.

As to the fees incurred by petitioner while represented by B. L. Dart and Mark

A. Larsen, the Court awards petitioner a judgment for the amount of $25,000 attorneys'
fees.
15.

The award of attorneys' fees shall be reduced to judgment with the judgment

for the past-due support.
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Petitioner is further awarded her costs incurred in this action in the sum of

$2,890 76 as reflected on Exhibit Nos 15 & 16
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The judgments entered in this action for arrearages of child support and

alimony and for attorneys' fees should be filed in the State of Alaska to attach respondent's
interest in the Kodiak property and in Summit County, Utah, to attach respondent's interest
in the Bear Hollow property
Dated this ZQ^day of

1999

^LJIJ

BY THE COURT

Rodney ^ p a g e , District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

^U^J^^^—ELLEN MAYCO£K
Attorney for Respondent
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the _/

day of July. 1999, I mailed a copy of the foregoing

to:
Ellen Maycock
Attorney for Respondent
50 West Broadway, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
David Benard, Esq.
523 Heritage Blvd., #1
Layton, UT 84041
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APPENDIX B

SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
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COUNTY OF DAVIS, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT '

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Sonia Kellev
Plaintiff.

Case No. 944700827
v.

Judge: Rodney S. Page

Wayne Kelley
Defendant

This matter originally came before the Court for trial on December 3rd, 4th and 9th of
1998; after closing arguments on December 9th the Court issued its findings, conclusions and
judgment from the bench. Plaintiffs attorney was directed to prepare findings and decree in
accordance with the Court's ruling. Because of various objections filed by the parties to the
proposed documents, the findings and decree were not signed by the Court or filed until July 20,
1999.
On August 23, 1999. respondent filed his Notice of Appeal. On August 23, 2000, the
Court of Appeals made itsruling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court's decision in certain
respects and reversed on others. The Court of Appeals remanded to the Court the question of
property distribution and the duration of alimony for further findings and ruling.
After numerous attempts by the parties: to resolve the issues, short of trial, the matter was
set for further hearing on those issues on August 16, 2001. Following the trial, counsel elected to
submit their closing arguments bv wav of memorandum.

The Court, having reviewed the evidence from both the first and second trials, and having
reviewed the memoranda submitted by counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereb}
rules as follows:
These parties were initially married on Ma\ 24, 1980 and two children were born as issue
of the marriage. The parties were divorced for the first time pursuant to a stipulated decree
entered on July 18, 1994.
The decree awarded to the petitioner, the home of the parties subject to the indebtedness
thereon, the furniture and fixtures, and the two vehicles in her possession. The respondent was
awarded any other interest the parties had in real estate including the Alaska property subject to
the indebtedness thereon. Respondent was also awarded the vehicle in his possession, certain
furniture and fixtures, and his DSI International stock, and any interest the parties had in DSI
International.
The decree awarded the petitioner $1,000 per month child support, and $1,000 per month
alimony. The alimony was to be terminated within three years, upon remarriage of the petitioner,
or by operation of law, whichever occurred first.
At the time of the 1994 decree, the petitioner was not working, and had not worked since
early in the marriage. Her expenses were far beyond the $2,000 per month she was awarded in
the decree. Her house payment alone was $2,400 per month.
Following the divorce in 1994, the parties immediately entered into a common law
marital relationship. They continued to act just as they had before the decree was entered. The
children were not told of the divorce. The parties filed joint income tax returns in 1994, and
continued to hold themselves out as a married couple. The respondent continued to provide
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petitioner with approximately $7,500 per month to meet family expenses, just as he had done
prior 10 the decree being entered. None of the titles to property awarded in the decree were ever
changed until the parties began having difficulty in 1996.
The questions now before the Court are: 1) the division of the separate property brought
into the marriage, and any additions thereto, and of any property acquired during the common
law marriage; and 2) whether there are any extenuating circumstances which would justify the
Court in extending the alimony beyond the five year duration of the common law marriage.
As stated in petitioner's memorandum, the case of Burt vs. Burt, 779. P2d 1166 (UT App.
1990) sets forth the procedure to be followed in regards to the property issues.
The Burt decision requires the Court to categorize the parties' property as being part of
the marital estate, or separate property.
If the property is separate property, then presumption is that each of the parties is entitled
to his/her own separate property except in exceptional circumstances.
As to marital property, it is presumed that each of the parties is entitled to one-half.
In applying that rationale to the property here before the Court, the Court finds as
follows:
During the course of the common law marriage, petitioner acquired no additional
property. The property awarded to her in the 1994 decree is separate property. However, the
Court finds that during the period of the common law marriage, petitioner's home appreciated in
value, and the principle due on the home was reduced by payments on the mortgage made from
the monies from the marital estate. The increase in equity which resulted from the appreciation
in value and reduction in principle would be a marital asset. However, during the trial in August,
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the parties stipulated that respondent would waive any claim to that increased equity in exchange
for petitioner's paying the attorney lees owing to Ms. Louise Knauer that the respondent was
previously ordered to pay. The Court approved that stipulation.
As to the real property awarded to the respondent in the 1994 decree, there was no
evidence to indicate that the Alaska property had appreciated in value.
The Court previously found that the DSI stock had some value at the time of the decree in
1994. but was not able to ascenain that value based upon the evidence presented at the trial.
There is no question the DSI International had some value, but because of its substantial debt
structure, it was impossible to ascertain that value. The evidence was that with its purchase of
the Williams Company, its liabilities far exceeded its receivables. The settling of the F & D law
suit, which provided some 1.3 million in settlement to DSI, did not substantially change that.
The fact that DSI chose to invest that money in a new venture to develop high-end residential
property did not substantially change the picture. Significant debt over and above the settlement
amount still existed.
The Court concludes that the only real value that DSI has is reflected in its goodwill
value, which may have attached as a result of its having acquired the Williams Company and the
reputation attached thereto in the industry.
The Court finds that the goodwill value is best reflected in the fact that the Elgie
Company was willing to loan $25,000 on the stock to the respondent so that he could gain
release of his passport from the Office of Recovery Services. The stock was pledged as security
for the loan and when the respondent defaulted on the loan, the stock was forfeited to Elgie
Corporation.
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The Court finds that the goodwill value of $25,000, which attached to the corporation in
1998, was essentially the same value it would have had at the time of the decree in 1994.
The Court therefore concludes that DSI stocks value remained about the same and
therefore, whatever interest the respondent retains in the DSI stock or DSI is not a marital asset.
In July oi'' 1996, respondent purchased certain property in Park City known as the Bear
Hollow property. That property was titled in respondent's name alone. Respondent obtained a
loan of $250,000 in his name on the Bear Hollow property from Olympus Investments in 1997.
He used the $250,000 to begin construction on the Bear Hollow property and to pay various
other personal expenses.
Olympus Investment was a Washington corporation set up for the purpose of facilitating
the loan to the respondent. The money came from a Mr. Charles Walch and certain unnamed
investors in Switzerland. It was a high-interest loan carrying about eighteen percent interest.
The respondent, along with Mr. Fred Frink, facilitated the organization of the Olympus
Investment Corporation, and acted as officers and directors. Elaine Gerber, a friend of the
respondent, also served as an agent for Olympus Investment.
Subsequently, the respondent obtained another construction mortgage on the Bear Hollow
property from On Line Lending in the amount of $500,000 in his name. The Olympus
Investment loan was subordinated to the On Line loan, so that the On Line loan took first
position on the Bear Hollow property.
After this time, DSI International also invested large sums in the development of the Bear
Hollow property. DSI filed a lien against the Bear Hollow property and the parties in this matter
seeking to regain their invested money, and to determine the priority of the numerous claims on
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the property. That case is still pending in Summit County. In the Spring of 1999, the Bear
Hollow propert} was soid. From the proceeds, the loan to On Line Lending was paid off, and
also a check was issued to Olympus Investment to pay off their mortgage on the propert}'. That
check was issued to Ms. Elaine Gerber. a friend of the respondent, in the amount of $361,146 in
April of 1999, and sent to her at her address in Texas, where she was residing with the
respondent. She in turn, endorsed the check over to Walch Investments, the company of Mr.
Charles Walch. who provided some of the money for the initial loan from Olympus Investment
on the Bear Hollow propert}.
The Court finds the evidence insufficient to prove that the $361,146, or any part thereof,
was actually the property of the respondent, and thus a marital asset.
There are still additional funds being held in escrow by the Court in Summit County
pending a determination of interests of DSI and the parties in the Bear Hollow property.
The Court concludes that whatever interest the parties may have in the proceeds of the
sell of the Bear Hollow property is a marital asset and each should be awarded one-half of any
such sums.
The Court finds that during the course of the common law marriage, respondent
purchased certain furniture and fixtures for the Bear Hollow residence from marital assets. The
Court would find that the items whicli were attached to the Bear Hollow residence and sold with
it are fixtures, and their value is reflected in the sale price of the Bear Hollow residence.
The other items of furniture listed on Plaintiffs Exhibit 32 are marital assets, with the
exception of the items purchased for the girls, which belong to them.
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As to the hems oi furniture listed on the exhibit, the Court regards them as used items
with a value general]) in the range of one-third their purchase value. The Court would award
those items to the respondent in light of his obligation to pay the marital debts incurred during
the course of the common law marriage.
In September of 1995, as a result of the work on the F & D law suit for DSI International,
the Board of Directors elected to give respondent a bonus in the range of $120,000. He, at the
time, elected to take that bonus in the form of a new Mercedes 600 SL. Respondent ordered the
vehicle for delivery in Europe.
In September of 1996, he went to Germany to pick up the vehicle. It was paid for by DSI
International. The purchase order was made out in respondent's name alone. He brought the car
back to the United States and drove it for a period of time. In the Summer of 1998, respondent
sold the vehicle to Mr. Fred Frink, a business associate, for $95,000. The vehicle was titled in
his name in Alaska at the time of the sale to Mr. Frink. Respondent signed a bill of sale in his
own name on the vehicle to Mr. Frink; and Mr. Frink paid respondent $50,000 cash and signed a
note to respondent personally for $45,000 dated June 1, 1998. At no time did any paperwork in
conjunction with the vehicle ever indicate that it belonged to anyone other than the respondent.
The Court finds that the testimony of the respondent in regards to the vehicle is less than
credible. The Court finds that the value of the vehicle was a bonus paid to respondent during the
course of the marriage and that petitioner is entitled to one-half of its value, or $47,500.
In 1996, Ms. Teresa Turner purchased an E class Mercedes. Respondent arranged for the
purchase of the vehicle and provided a certified check to the dealer for the purchase price in the
approximate amount of $30,000. The Court finds that $20,000 of that amount was provided by
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Ms. Turner as part of an inheritance she received from her aunt. The balance of $10,000 was
provided by the respondent, but was repayment for a loan made to respondent in the amount of
$10,000 by Ms. Turner when she sold her prior vehicle.
The Court concludes that neither the vehicle nor the $10,000 supplied by respondent are
pan of tiie marital estate, and that petitioner has no interest therein.
In 1998. the respondent arranged for the purchase of a 1998 Oldsmobile for Ms. Elaine
Gerber, to be picked up in Illinois in her name and with her money. The Court finds that the
vehicle was the property of Elaine Gerber and the respondent had no interest therein.
Lastly, the Court turns to the purchase of an engagement ring by the respondent for Ms.
Gerber in the Summer of 1998. The respondent paid approximately $24,000 for the ring. He
paid twenty percent down and agreed to pay the balance in one year together with interest.
The Court concludes that the balance owing on the ring with interest would approximate
the value of the ring. It has no value as a marital asset.
The Court further concludes that any interest which the respondent has in Omega Oil is
speculative, at best, and that stock or interest is awarded to him free and clear of any claim of the
petitioner.
The Court next turns to the question of whether there are extenuating circumstances
which would justify the Court in awarding alimony to the petitioner for a period longer than the
five year length of the common law marriage. In that regard, the Court finds that these parties
had been married a total of fourteen years when the Decree of Divorce was entered in July, 1994.
As part of that decree, the parties stipulated to child support in the amount of $1,000 per month,
and alimony of $ 1,000 per month. The alimony was to terminate in three years, upon petitioner's
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remarriage, or by operation of law, whichever occurred first. At the time of the decree, petitioner
had not worked out of the home since their marriage in 1980. She had no income. Her expenses
far JXCjcded the two thousand per month provided in the decree. Her house payment alone,
without considering any other expenses, was $2,400 per month. The respondent had been
providing her approximately $7,500 per month to meet family expenses.
The provisions of the 1994 decree were clearly inadequate as evidenced by the parties'
continued actions. The}- continued to reside together in a common law relationship just as
though no decree hue; ever been entered. Respondent continued to provide support to petitioner
and the children in the amount in excess of $7,000 per month, just as he had before. The
petitioner and the children continued in the lifestyle to which they had been accustomed. It was
not until after the parties began having difficulty in 1996 that things changed.
Subsequently the Commissioner established temporary support and alimony of $6,000
per month. At trial, based upon the petitioner's gross income of $1,486 per month, and
respondent's historical income of $10,000 per month, and in light of the expenses of the parties,
the Court set child support at $2,000 and alimony at $3,000 per month.
The Court would find that the parties have been married continually, in either a regular or
common law marriage, from 1980 through July of 1999, some eighteen-plus years.
The Court concludes that, based upon the long duration of the marriage, the standard of
living to which the petitioner and the children have become accustomed and were encouraged in
by the respondent, the needs of the petitioner and her inability to make more than $1,486 per
month, and the respondent's ability to make substantially more, (and all these being
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extraordinary circumstances), justify the Court in extending alimony beyond the term of the
common law marriage.
From the foregoing findings and conclusions, the Court enters judgment as follows:
The Court hereby orders that the Decree of Divorce heretofore entered by the Court be
amended to award to the parties equally whatever interest the parties may have in the Bear
Hollow law suit presently pending in the Summit County Court.
That the petitioner be awarded judgment against the respondent in the sum of S47.5000 as
her share of the Mercedes 600 SL.
That the respondent pay alimony to the petitioner at the rate of $3,000 per month from
December, 1998 for a period often years, or until remarriage of the petitioner, whichever occurs
first.
Each of the parties are to pay their own attorney fees and hold the other harmless thereon.
Petitioner's counsel is to prepare findings and judgment in accordance with the Court's
ruling, and submit the same to opposing counsel at least five days before it is submitted to the
Court for signature.

Dated this

1 0 ^ day of April, AD 2002

BY THE COURT:

Rodney S.^P>ge
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